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HAS ERISA CLOSED OUR LABORATORIES?  OPTIONS FOR STATE 
HEALTH REFORM 
INTRODUCTION 
An individual’s health and access to medical care are considered by 
many to be unassailable human rights.1  This concept separates the medical 
care and health insurance industries from every other industry in our society.  
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, countries throughout the world 
have recognized the unique importance of medical care.2  As a result, many 
have implemented universal healthcare systems to assure access to care for 
all of their citizens.3  Despite several efforts, the United States has never 
installed a system ensuring healthcare for the entire population.4  
Consequently, a significant uninsured population exists in the United States.5  
In 2006, the United States Census Bureau estimated the uninsured 
population to be forty-seven million Americans, representing 15.8% of the 
American population.6  While this number represents the largest uninsured 
population this country has ever faced, the United States has had more than 
thirty million uninsured individuals every year for the past two decades.7  In 
fact, according to a study conducted by Families USA, one in three 
 
 1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at Article 25, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 2. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 236-40 (1982) 
(describing the numerous European countries implementing a variety of health plans prior to 
World War I). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Karen Davis, Universal Coverage in the United States: Lessons from Experience of 
the 20th Century, 78 J. URBAN HEALTH 46, 46-48 (2001) (discussing the attempts by Presidents 
Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Bush, and Clinton to 
expand healthcare and provide universal coverage); see also John E. McDonough, The Road 
to Universal Health Coverage in Massachusetts: A Story in Three Parts, NEW ENG. J. PUB. 
POL’Y, Fall 2004/Winter 2005, at 57, 57-58 (discussing the attempts of former Presidents to 
expand health coverage for various groups of Americans). 
 5. Gail R. Wilensky, Viable Strategies for Dealing with the Uninsured, HEALTH AFF., 
Spring 1987, at 33, 34. 
 6. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 18 (2007), available 
at www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter 
2006 CENSUS]. 
 7. Id.; see also Wilensky, supra note 5, at 35. 
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Americans under the age of sixty-five was uninsured for all or part of 2006-
2007.8  One of the leading reasons for the growing uninsured population is 
the decrease in employer-based health insurance.9  Traditionally, the 
perception has been that the uninsured population is largely comprised of 
unemployed individuals.10  However, in reality, four out of five uninsured 
individuals are members of working families.11  This large percentage of 
uninsured, working individuals highlights the need for an affordable 
healthcare option and a shift in the way legislators perceive the necessity of 
healthcare reform. 
The federal government has repeatedly enacted legislation attempting to 
reduce the number of uninsured Americans and protect the most vulnerable 
populations in society.  These efforts include the creation of Medicare, 
Medicaid, and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).12  
While these programs have had limited success in protecting the elderly, 
portions of the poor and disabled populations, and poor children, the 
number of uninsured in America continues to rise.13  The failure of the 
federal government to reduce the uninsured population has prompted states 
to take steps to insure the health of their citizens. 
As noted by Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, states 
have long been recognized as the country’s “laboratories.”14  Since Justice 
Brandeis’ famous words over seventy years ago, the growing uninsured 
population and the rapid escalation of medical costs have amplified the 
 
 8. FAMILIES USA, WRONG DIRECTION: ONE OUT OF THREE AMERICANS ARE UNINSURED 9 
(2007), available at www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/wrong-direction.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 
2009). 
 9. 2006 CENSUS, supra note 6, at 18 (“The percentage of people covered by 
employment-based heath insurance decreased to 59.7 percent in 2006, from 60.2 percent in 
2005.”); THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED AND THEIR ACCESS TO HEALTH 
CARE 1 (2007), available at www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/1420-10.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 
2009). 
 10. See Democratic Policy Committee, The Uninsured in America: Expert Panel Spotlights 
Consequences of Not Having Health Insurance, at http://democrats.senate.gov/dpc/ 
dpc.cfm?A=fs&B=108&C=1&D=355 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009); see also The NewsHour 
with Jim Lehrer/Kaiser Family Found., Survey Highlights: Part 1, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM, 
at www.pbs.org/newshour/health/uninsured/survey_highlights.html (last visited Feb. 13, 
2009). 
 11. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 9 (discussing the uninsured population 
in the U.S. in 2006). 
 12. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., CMS 
Programs and Information, at www.cms.hhs.gov (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). See 42 U.S.C. § 
1395 et seq. (Medicare) See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (Medicaid); See H.R. 2015 (known as 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which created the SCHIP program). 
 13. 2006 CENSUS, supra note 6, at 19. 
 14. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Justice Brandeis 
describing the benefit of states experimenting without putting the rest of the country at risk). 
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need for state experimentation. In 2004, the estimated cost of 
uncompensated care for the uninsured was forty-one billion dollars, with 
state governments paying roughly twenty-seven percent of those costs.15  To 
combat their expanding financial obligation, state governments have 
attempted to enact a spectrum of legislation geared to increase coverage 
for citizens and lower medical costs.  However, the preemption clause 
included in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
severely limits state innovation.16 When ERISA was passed, “almost no one 
imagined [the current] medical marketplace dominated by managed care;” 
thus the language of ERISA frequently conflicts with states’ health reform 
efforts.17  Consequently, the federal legislation preempts these reforms.18  
Therefore, states not only have to be innovative with their health reform 
efforts, but they must also be equally innovative in drafting the reform in 
order for it to survive an ERISA challenge.  With the majority of Americans 
stating that they favor both mandated health insurance and the continuation 
of employers financially contributing to the rising cost of healthcare, 
pressure is mounting on state officials to implement comprehensive health 
reform.19 
The purpose of this article is to provide state legislatures with a how-to 
guide for drafting health reform legislation that will avoid ERISA preemption.  
Part I of this article provides a brief history of ERISA and the intent behind its 
creation followed by an examination of the relevant parts of the statute: the 
preemption clause, the savings clause, and the deemer clause.  While the 
savings and deemer clauses are critical for understanding the preemption 
 
 15. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER 11 (2007), available at 
www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-03.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter THE 
UNINSURED] 
 16. Protection of Employee Benefit Rights, Pub. L. No. 93-406 § 514, 88 Stat. 832 
(1974), (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)); Walter E. Schuler, Note, 
The ERISA Pre-Emption Narrows: Analysis of New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company and Its Impact on State Regulation of Health 
Care, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783, 783-784 (1996) (describing ERISA as “the most formidable 
obstacle to state health care reform efforts”). 
 17. M. Gregg Bloche & David M. Studdert, A Quiet Revolution: Law as an Agent of 
Health System Change, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 29, 30. 
 18. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 108-109 (1983) (holding elements of 
New York’s Human Rights Law preempted by ERISA); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 
475 F.3d 180, 197-198 (4th Cir. 2007) (declaring Maryland’s Fair Share Act preempted by 
ERISA); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Suffolk County, 497 F.Supp.2d 403, 418-419 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (holding Suffolk County’s Fair Share for Health Care Act preempted by ERISA). 
 19. SARA R. COLLINS & JENNIFER L. KRISS, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE PUBLIC’S VIEWS 
ON HEALTH CARE REFORM IN THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 3-4  (2008), available at 
www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Collins_pubviewshltcarereform2008election_1095_ib.
pdf?section=4039 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). 
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clause, the discussion of this article centers around the preemption clause 
and its application to state health reform.  Part II first outlines ERISA’s 
judicial history relating to state reform on employer-based health plans, 
focusing on the Supreme Court cases of Shaw20 and Travelers21 and the 
recent Fourth Circuit Fielder22 case.  Part II then discusses a framework to 
utilize in evaluating ERISA challenges to state health reform.  Part III 
introduces Massachusetts’ 2006 health insurance legislation, “An Act 
Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Healthcare 
(Massachusetts Act)”,23 and addresses the sections of the legislation that are 
vulnerable to an ERISA challenge.24  Finally, Part IV delineates the lessons 
learned from case law and offers a comprehensive reform plan that would 
provide all of the benefits of the Massachusetts Act without the employer 
mandate and the accompanying ERISA concerns. 
I.  THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF ERISA 
A. Historical Background of ERISA 
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to protect employee pension plans.25  
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, pension plan abuse increased 
dramatically, and no enforcement mechanisms existed to combat the 
problem.26  Despite previous legislative attempts, no guarantee existed that 
benefits would ever be paid to the thirty million people who held pension 
plans in 1970.27 The passage of ERISA federalized pension law provided a 
necessary enforcement mechanism to ensure the delivery of benefits.28 To 
achieve this federalization, Congress recognized the importance of national 
uniformity and included a strong preemption clause in the legislation. 
ERISA’s preemption clause, Section 1144(a), states that “the provisions 
of this [Act]. . .shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may 
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. . .”29  The preemption 
 
 20. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
 21. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 649 (1995). 
 22. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 23. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 2006 
Mass. Acts c. 58, at www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sl060058.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 
2009). 
 24. Id. 
 25. David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective 
Federalism, 48 U. PITT L. REV. 427, 443, 446 (1987). 
 26. Id. at 443. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 446. 
 29. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). 
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clause is interesting in a number of aspects: the reach of the preemption 
clause is unusually broad and the language of the legislation puts very few 
limits on the preemptive powers.  These strengths of the preemption clause 
are credited to the conference committee whose members believed that the 
preemptive power of the original bill was insufficient.30  While this strong 
preemption clause was essential to achieve national uniformity, relating to 
pension law, it has created a “‘regulatory vacuum’” regarding employee 
benefit plans.31  Unlike most federal legislation, ERISA’s preemption clause 
prohibits states from regulating an area that federal law does not address: 
employee health insurance.32  Finally, courts have interpreted the vague 
“relates to” language broadly for the past three decades.33  This broad 
interpretation will be discussed in detail later in this article. 
An employee benefit plan is defined as “any plan, fund, or program . . . 
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee 
organization . . . for the purpose of providing for its participants or their 
beneficiaries . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits”.34  
Consequently, most employer health insurance plans fall under the 
regulation of ERISA, and state laws attempting to regulate employee benefit 
plans invoke ERISA’s preemption clause.  Additionally, two other important 
clauses are included in Section 1144.  The first is 1144(b)(2)(A), the 
“savings clause,” which states that the preemption clause shall not “be 
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which 
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”35  The savings clause carves out 
an area for states to regulate insurance companies, banks, and securities 
companies.  While the savings clause clearly reserves the states’ ability to 
regulate certain areas, the next subsection of 1144, the “deemer clause,” 
severely limits the scope of the savings clause.  The deemer clause asserts 
that states cannot deem employers to be “insurers,” nor can states deem 
 
 30. See CAROL S. WEISSERT & WILLIAM G. WEISSERT, GOVERNING HEALTH: THE POLITICS OF 
HEALTH POLICY 42 (3d ed. 2006). 
 31. Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in ERISA: Legislative Process 
and Health Policy, 7 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 47, 48 (1988). 
 32. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 467 (3rd Cir. 2003) (discussing 
ERISA’s power to preempt state law without providing guidance in the area); see also Fox & 
Schaffer, supra note 31, at 48 (stating “[t]he preemption clause of ERISA is unusual because it 
forbids the states to regulate employee benefits even when federal law is silent.”). 
 33. See Deborah S. Davidson, Note, Balancing the Interests of State Health Care Reform 
and Uniform Employee Benefit Laws Under ERISA: A “Uniform Patient Protection Act”, 53 
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 203, 205 (1998). 
 34. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000). 
 35. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000). 
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employee benefit plans to be insurance.36  Furthermore, self-funded plans 
are not insurance and therefore laws regulating self-funded plans cannot be 
protected by the savings clause.37  The vast majority of health benefit plans 
are self-funded plans and fit within the deemer clause, and thus cannot be 
saved under the savings clause.38  As a result, many laws relating to health 
benefit plans offered by employers are not saved from the broad reach of 
the preemption clause. 
While ERISA has largely succeeded in achieving the protection and 
uniformity Congress desired for pension plans, the broad scope and 
ambiguous language of the preemption clause often results in unintended 
consequences.  The stifling of state innovation, essentially shutting down the 
nation’s health reform laboratories, is one of the most detrimental of these 
consequences. 
II.  THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE PREEMPTION CLAUSE 
A. ERISA Case Law 
The ambiguity of the preemption clause forces states to rely on court 
rulings to determine the breadth of the statute.  For the first two decades 
after ERISA’s enactment, case law suggested that the preemption clause was 
unrestricted.  A footnote in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc. was the first 
suggestion that the preemption clause was not limitless.39  Despite this 
comment, the Shaw Court still found that the New York Human Rights Law 
at issue was preempted by ERISA because it “related to” employee benefit 
plans.40  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Shaw provided the first insight into 
how the Court would approach ERISA preemption by attempting to define 
“relates to.”  First, the Court stated that a “law ‘relates to’ an employee 
benefit plan . . . if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”41  
 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000) (“[No] employee benefit plan...shall be deemed to 
be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to 
be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State.”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Ctr. for Financing, Access, and Cost Trends, Agency for Healthcare Research & 
Quality.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Percent of 
Private-Sector Enrollees that Are Enrolled in Self-Insured Plans at Establishments That Offer 
Health Insurance by Firm Size and State: United States, 2005, at tbl.II.B.2.b(1), available at 
www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/state/series_2/2005/tiib2b1.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2009). 
 39. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 84, 100 n.21 (1983) (stating that “[s]ome 
state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a 
manner to warrant a finding that the law ‘relates to’ the plan.”). 
 40. Id. at 86. 
 41. Id. at 96-97. 
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The Court determined that unless there was an indication that Congress 
intended the use of a different definition, the plain language definition of 
“relates to” should be used to determine if a law falls within the scope of 
ERISA.42  This broad definition was applied for over a decade to evaluate 
state laws.  However, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company eventually addressed the 
language that the Shaw Court introduced in its footnote.43 
Travelers is viewed by many scholars as a “paradigm shift” in the 
Court’s interpretation of the preemption clause toward a more relaxed 
standard that allows state legislatures more flexibility.44  The Court in 
Travelers determined that a New York state statute requiring hospitals to 
collect surcharges from patients with health insurance from a commercial 
insurer, rather than a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan, and placing surcharges 
on health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that vary depending on the 
number of Medicaid recipients enrolled in the plan, was not preempted by 
ERISA.45  In so deciding, the Court noted that “pre-emption claims turn on 
Congress’s intent”.46  Congress intended to create a uniform body of law 
and to minimize administrative burdens on multi-state employers.47  The 
Court also noted that the “relates to” analysis established in Shaw was 
flawed because “[i]f ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of 
its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never 
run its course, for ‘[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere’”.48  With this 
statement, the Court created a new framework to apply when a state law 
was challenged on ERISA preemption grounds. 
The framework created by Travelers Court centered on Congress’s 
desire for a uniform body of law for multi-state employers to follow when 
establishing employee benefit plans.49  Consequently, ERISA preempts state 
laws that mandate “employee benefit structures or their administration.”50  
 
 42. Id. at 97. 
 43. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995). 
 44. Sharon Reece, ERISA Preemption and Fair Share Legislation 11 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of 
Law, Working Paper No. 2007-23, 2007), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006026 (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2009); see also PATRICIA A. BUTLER, ERISA AND STATE HEALTH CARE ACCESS INITIATIVES: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 3 (2000), available at www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/ 
Publications/Fund-Reports/2000/Oct/ERISA-and-State-Health-Care-Access-Initiatives--
Opportunities-and-Obstacles.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). 
 45. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 649. 
 46. Id. at 655. 
 47. Id. at 656-57. 
 48. Id. at 655 (quoting H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed., World’s Classics 
1980)). 
 49. Id. at 656-57. 
 50. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 658. 
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However, an indirect economic influence “does not bind plan administrators 
to any particular choice”, and therefore state laws that only impose an 
indirect economic influence are not preempted.51  The Travelers Court’s 
reasoning stemmed from the footnote in Shaw and sets the case apart from 
every preceding ERISA decision.52 
The Court limited the preemption clause further when it noted that 
nothing in the federal statute suggested that Congress intended to supplant 
state laws concerning “general health care regulation, which historically has 
been a matter of local concern.”53  The protection of areas that have 
historically fallen under state regulation is cited by many legislators and 
scholars in their attempt to defend state laws from ERISA preemption.54  
Importantly, the Court stated that “cost uniformity was almost certainly not 
an object of pre-emption, just as laws with only an indirect economic effect 
on the relative costs of various health insurance packages in a given State 
are a far cry from those ‘conflicting directives’ from which Congress meant 
to insulate ERISA plans.”55  However, the preemption exception carved out 
in Travelers is limited in scope. 
The Court placed the boundary of the exception at the point in which a 
law created a “Hobson’s choice” by installing taxes or assessments so 
prohibitive that the choice offered was no real choice.56  The Court further 
noted 
that a state law might produce such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, 
by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme 
of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and that 
such a state law might indeed be pre-empted under § 514.57 
This language is critical because it established that while a state law might 
not explicitly influence an employee benefit plan, ERISA still preempts the 
law if it has a strong enough indirect effect on the plan.  Therefore, to avoid 
ERISA preemption, state legislatures must draft legislation that does not 
 
 51. Id. at 659. 
 52. Id. at 661 (discussing Shaw, citing District of Columbia v. Greater Washington  Bd. of 
Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n.1 (1992)). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 203 (4th Cir. 2007); see 
also Maureen McOwen, Note, Through the Eye of the Needle: How the New York City Health 
Care Security Act Will Escape ERISA Preemption, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 37, 64 
(2006); PATRICIA A. BUTLER, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, ERISA IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE 
HEALTH CARE ACCESS INITIATIVES: IMPACT OF THE MARYLAND “FAIR SHARE ACT” COURT DECISION 8 
(2006), a www.statecoverage.org/node/170 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter BUTLER, 
FAIR SHARE ACT]. 
 55. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 662. 
 56. Id. at 664. 
 57. Id. at 668. 
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directly mention employee benefit plans, directly interfere with the structure 
or administration of the plans, or have a strong indirect effect on plans or 
their administration. 
Since the decision in Travelers, many states have either drafted or 
enacted state health reforms.58  One of these reforms, Maryland’s Fair 
Share Health Care Fund Act (the Fair Share Act), both provides a useful 
example of the application of the Travelers frameworks and offers additional 
insight into how courts might apply ERISA’s preemption clause. 
Maryland’s Fair Share Act mandated employers with more than 10,000 
employees in the state of Maryland to contribute a “fair share” to their 
employees’ healthcare costs.59  Employers could satisfy this requirement in 
two ways: 1) use eight percent of their payroll to fund employee healthcare 
or health insurance, or 2) pay the state eight percent of their payroll or the 
difference between the amount that they spent on healthcare and eight 
percent of their payroll.60  There were only four employers with more than 
10,000 employees in the state of Maryland, and of the four employers Wal-
Mart was the only employer who was not already contributing at least eight 
percent of its payroll to employee health care.61  The Fair Share Act quickly 
came under fire from the Retail Industry Leaders Association, who claimed 
the law was preempted by ERISA.62  After looking at the nature and effect of 
the Fair Share Act to determine whether it fell within ERISA’s preemption, the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision that ERISA preempted 
the Act.63  The court reasoned that there was no real choice offered by the 
Fair Share Act because employers would always choose to build good will 
with their employees by offering health coverage rather than pay the state.64  
Consequently, the Court determined the Fair Share Act illegally mandated 
that the structure of employee benefit plans.65  Further, the Court stated the 
Fair Share Act conflicted with Congress’s desire to have uniformity because 
other states could easily adopt similar laws placing conflicting requirements 
on multi-state employers.66  The Fair Share Act was preempted because it 
 
 58. See Gail A. Jensen & Michael A. Morrisey, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and 
Mandated Benefit Laws, 77 MILBANK QUARTERLY 425, 425 (1999). 
 59. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-102 (West 2008). 
 60. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-104(b) (West 2008). 
 61. Reece, supra note 44, at 18; Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 
185 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 62. See generally Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 63. Id. at 183, 193. 
 64. Id. at 193. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 194. 
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“related to” employee benefit plans and it conflicted with the Congressional 
intent behind ERISA.67 
Rather than simply applying the Travelers reasoning, the Fielder Court 
discussed several other factors in its decision.  The Court gave weight to the 
fact that the Maryland legislature knew that the Fair Share Act would only 
apply to Wal-Mart, and the goal of the law was to have Wal-Mart provide 
health insurance to more of its employees.68  This point is salient because it 
shows that the Court looks beyond the four corners of state legislation to 
determine the legislature’s objectives.  Hence, a state cannot express on the 
record an aspiration to have employers cover more of the healthcare costs 
of their employees.  Additionally, the Court pointed out that the Fair Share 
Act could not be considered a law of general applicability because the 
legislature knew that it would only affect, at most, four employers.69  This 
statement suggests that any state health reform directed at employers must 
be broad in its application to avoid ERISA concerns.  Although Fielder is not 
binding precedent beyond the Fourth Circuit, the case has received national 
attention and is likely to impact other circuits.  When the factors discussed in 
Fielder are combined with the rules established in Shaw, Travelers, and 
other cases in which state laws were challenged by ERISA preemption, a 
framework can be created for state legislatures to use to evaluate the 
likelihood a law will survive an ERISA challenge.70 
B. Framework to Apply to State Laws 
While ERISA was enacted over three decades ago, a tremendous 
amount of confusion remains about the law and how courts will apply the 
law.  Numerous scholars have examined court holdings in an attempt to 
predict the application of the statute to future cases.  The combination of 
these attempts yields a comprehensive framework to direct state legislatures. 
1. Is the Law in an Area Traditionally Regulated by the States? 
To determine whether a law pertains to an area traditionally regulated 
by the states, state legislatures should first consider how Congress intended 
ERISA to function.  Both Travelers and Fielder emphasize that courts have 
denied the application of the preemption clause to areas that have 
 
 67. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 193-194 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 68. Id. at 185. 
 69. Id. at 194. 
 70. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (discussing 
the variety of rules established in Shaw); see also Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997). 
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historically been regulated by states.71  DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & 
Clinical Services Fund declared that these areas “include the regulation of 
matters of health and safety”.72  As one author comments, under the 
Travelers exception, if the area of law is one typically reserved for the state, 
there is a strong presumption against preemption; however, if the area of 
law is not typically one reserved for the state, there is a strong presumption 
of preemption.73  This interpretation seems to suggest that Travelers added 
another exception to the “too tenuous” exception to apply when evaluating 
whether a law “relates to” ERISA plans.  This possible additional exception 
highlights the confusion still surrounding the limits of “relates to.”  After 
determining whether a law regulates an area of traditional state authority, 
and whether there is a presumption of preemption, state legislatures must 
consider whether the law “relates to” an ERISA plan. 
2. Does the Law “Relate to” Employee Benefit Plans? 
Because the phrase “relates to” has not been interpreted uniformly, 
there are several elements that must be considered to determine whether a 
state law “relates to” an ERISA plan.  The Shaw, Travelers, and Fielder cases 
provide examples of these varying interpretations.  Some courts have 
examined whether the law relates to an ERISA plan in the traditional sense of 
the word. The Shaw Court employed this approach.74 Under this 
interpretation, a law is preempted if it explicitly refers to an employee benefit 
plan.75  Usually if a law falls into this category it requires employers to 
provide a specific type of coverage.76  Plans that implicitly require employers 
to provide specific coverage are likewise considered to relate to ERISA plans 
and are henceforth preempted.77  A second interpretation examines whether 
the law “regulates the same areas as ERISA (such as reporting, disclosure, 
or remedies)[.]”78  The final element that a court examines to determine 
whether a law relates to an ERISA plan is whether or not the law relies on 
the existence of ERISA plans to take effect.79  If a law depends on an ERISA 
 
 71. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995); Fielder, 475 F.3d at 191. 
 72. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 (1997). 
 73. Schuler, supra note 16, at 813. 
 74. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). 
 75. Id. at 97. 
 76. Karen A. Jordan, Travelers Insurance: New Support for the Argument to Restrain ERISA 
Preemption, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 255, 264 (1996). 
 77. Id. 
 78. BUTLER, supra note 44, at 4. 
 79. McOwen, supra note 54, at 59; see, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 
U.S. 133, 139-40 (1990) (finding that a Texas law that depended on the existence of a 
pension plan for recovery was preempted); see also Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement 
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plan to take effect, a court considers the law to implicitly refer to the plan.80  
If the court determines that the state law does not relate to an ERISA plan 
under any of these categories, it then evaluates if the law has a “connection 
with” an ERISA plan. 
3. Does the Law Have a “Connection to” Employee Benefit Plans? 
To decide if a law has a connection to an ERISA plan, a court must look 
at the nature of the law’s effect on employee benefit plans.81  The Travelers 
Court utilized this type of analysis.82  The first step in evaluating whether the 
law has a connection is to determine if the law is one of general 
applicability.  If the law is not one of general application, the likelihood that 
it will be preempted is higher.83  However, if the law is generally applicable 
the court next looks at the effect that it will have on ERISA plans.84  If there is 
only a limited, economic effect on the ERISA plan the court will likely rule, 
similarly to Travelers, that the law is not preempted.  However, if the effect is 
“acute, albeit indirect,” the court will likely find that the law has a 
connection with the ERISA plan and is consequently preempted.85  If the 
court determines that the economic effects are not severe enough to 
establish a connection and invoke the preemption clause, the court 
examines the other effects of the law. 
If a state law affects the structure or administration of an employee 
benefit plan, it will be preempted by ERISA.86  A direct mandate of a 
coverage type or the creation of a “Hobson’s choice” establishes these 
effects.87  For example, in Fielder, Wal-Mart’s choice to either spend eight 
percent of its payroll on employee healthcare or pay eight percent of its 
payroll to the government was considered a Hobson’s choice.88  Courts 
 
v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 328, 332 (1997) (finding that because a California law 
did not require an ERISA plan in order to be enforced it did not relate to an ERISA plan and 
was therefore not preempted). 
 80. McOwen, supra note 54, at 59; see also Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 140. 
 81. Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland’s “Wal-Mart” Act: Policy and Preemption, 28 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 847, 859-862 (2006) (quoting Egelhoff, v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001)). 
 82. See generally New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 649, 658-660 (1995). 
 83. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 84. Schuler, supra note 16, at 814. 
 85. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668. 
 86. Id. at 658. 
 87. Id. at 664.  A Hobson’s choice is “an apparent freedom to take or reject something 
offered when in actual fact no such freedom exists: an apparent freedom of choice where 
there is no real alternative” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Philip Babcock 
Gove et al. eds., 1993). 
 88. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 U.S. 180, 202 (2007) (Michael, J., 
dissenting). 
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have held that a Hobson’s choice is the equivalent of a substantive mandate 
and therefore impermissibly regulates the structure of employee benefit 
plans.89  The state law may avoid preemption if it provides a genuine choice 
for employers.  However, several scholars note that this exception turns on 
whether or not employers are bound to a particular decision rather than the 
availability of choices that are outlined in the law.90  The ambiguity of what 
binds an employer to a particular choice and what constitutes a legitimate 
choice is the topic of debate among scholars, leading to continued 
uncertainty about the fate of state health reform efforts.91 
The state of Massachusetts recently enacted a healthcare reform plan.  
Applying the established framework to examine whether the new 
Massachusetts plan allows us to determine if the law will survive a 
preemption challenge.  First, whether the Massachusetts statute regulates an 
area of traditional state authority should be evaluated.  Next, whether or not 
the statute relates to ERISA plans must be established.  Finally, it must be 
determined whether the statute has a connection with ERISA plans and, if so, 
whether the connection is direct enough to invoke the preemption clause. 
C. What We Have Learned About the Preemption Clause 
While case law provides some guidance about what types of legislation 
will be preempted by ERISA, significant ambiguity remains about how courts 
will apply the preemption clause to several areas of state health reform.  
Without Congressional or judicial direction, this uncertainty will continue to 
obscure reform efforts.  However, a path for state legislatures to follow can 
be predicted by reviewing relevant case law. 
Between Shaw, Travelers, and Fielder, courts have distinguished 
particular types of legislation that will likely be preempted.  While several 
scholars have produced checklists of steps for legislatures to follow, these 
guides are largely incomplete.92  However, the blending of these previous 
 
 89. Id. at 197. 
 90. See Reece, supra note 44, at 14 (“There is nothing in [the Traveler Court’s] language 
that suggests the Court was implying that a state law can avoid pre-emption by offering some 
sort of “choice” for employers or plan administrators.”); see also David B. Brandolph, Reform 
Proposals: Practitioners Debate Impact of Court Ruling Against Maryland’s ‘Fair Share’ 
Coverage Law, 15 HEALTH CARE POL’Y REP. (BNA) No. 4, at 136 (Jan. 29, 2007), at 
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/HCP.NSF/05c90bd7c41c619b85256b570059988c/f4b8bb1 
769a7edf88525726f00790deb?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) (“fair share laws 
cannot hide behind the rhetoric of merely offering ERISA-governed plans a ‘choice’”). 
 91. See Zelinsky, supra note 81, at 863; see also Reece, supra note 44, at 14. 
 92. See BUTLER, supra note 44, at 8; see also McOwen, supra note 54, at 59; PATRICIA A. 
BUTLER, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, REVISITING PAY OR PLAY: HOW STATES COULD 
EXPAND EMPLOYER-BASED COVERAGE WITHIN ERISA CONSTRAINTS 6-8 (2002), available at 
www.nashp.org/Files/ERISA_pay_or_play.PDF [hereinafter BUTLER, PAY OR PLAY]; Darren 
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efforts with the lessons of recent case law can produce a comprehensive 
guide for policy-makers.  Looking at each of the cases, courts thus far have 
established that state laws cannot: 
 Refer implicitly or explicitly to employee benefit plans93 
 Mandate the structure or administration of employee benefit plans94 
 Create either substantial direct or acute indirect economic effects that will 
force an employer to provide an employee benefit plan95 
 Rely on the existence of an employee benefit plan for terms of the 
legislation to take effect96 
 State that the goal of the legislation is to increase the number of 
employers offering health insurance97 
 Direct the legislation at a small number of employers98 
 Require an employer to provide health insurance,99 or 
 Create a “Hobson’s choice” in which the employer has no reasonable 
option except to provide health insurance100 
While this list eliminates the majority of strategies states can use to increase 
the number of employers providing meaningful health coverage for their 
employees, courts have provided limited insight into the types of legislations 
that will avoid ERISA preemption.  Additionally, scholars speculate about 
legislative strategies that might fit within the court’s guidelines.  Some of 
these approaches include: 
 If there will be economic effects, ensuring that the effects are indirect and 
unsubstantial101 
 If the legislation includes a tax or assessment against employers, ensuring 
the language is neutral regarding whether the employer pays the 
assessment or provides health insurance102 
 
Abernethy, Note, Of State Laboratories and Legislative Alloys: How “Fair Share” Laws Can Be 
Written to Avoid ERISA Preemption and Influence Private Sector Health Care Reform in 
America, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1859 (2008). 
 93. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). 
 94. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 658 (1995). 
 95. Id. at 668. 
 96. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990). 
 97. BUTLER, PAY OR PLAY, supra note 92, at 6-7. 
 98. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 194 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 99. Standard Oil Co. of California v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 
454 U.S. 801 (1981). 
 100. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 664 (1995). 
 101. Id. at 668. 
 102. BUTLER, PAY OR PLAY, supra note 92, at 7. 
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 Avoiding setting minimum coverage levels and types of coverage for 
employers to qualify for the tax credit or exemption from the 
assessment103 
 Drafting the legislation in a way that will make the effects of the law 
avoidable104 
 Drafting the legislation so that it falls within an area that is traditionally 
regulated by the state (e.g. taxes, health and welfare)105 
 Ensuring the legislation is drafted so it is generally applicable106 
 Writing a tax designed to help generate money for the Medicaid budget 
and low-income health insurance programs, making sure the language 
places the legislation in the realm of financing public health programs107 
Legislation drafted following these guidelines has the support of case law 
and consequently the greatest probability of surviving an ERISA challenge.  
However, questions remain about the effectiveness of any reform written 
within these boundaries.  The preemption of the pay or play legislation in 
both Fielder and Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Suffolk County and 
the tenuous position of the Massachusetts Act highlight the need for states to 
be very careful with the structure and language of the law when attempting 
to install pay or play legislation.108  However, because the laws in Fielder 
and Suffolk County were narrow in construction and were directed at a small 
segment of employers, there remains uncertainty and cautious optimism 
about the future treatment of pay or play laws. 
A recent ruling by the Ninth Circuit, declaring the San Francisco Health 
Care Security Ordinance requiring employers with more than twenty 
employees to help pay for healthcare costs safe from ERISA preemption, is 
likely to encourage legislatures drafting reform.109  This ruling is significant 
for obvious reasons.  The decision highlights the tension that exists between 
the various circuits, and suggests that legislation requiring a large number of 
employers to contribute to the health expenses of their employees might 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. McOwen, supra note 54, at 59. 
 105. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 194 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing 
laws traditionally regulated by the states); BUTLER, PAY OR PLAY, supra note 92, at 7. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Abernethy, supra note 92, at 1877-79 (discussing such a tax and the necessity 
for that tax to be collected by the treasury, etc. to be considered a true state tax); see also 
Reece, supra note 44, at 32. 
 108. See generally Fielder, 475 F.3d180; see also Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Suffolk 
County, 497 F.Supp.2d 403, 406, 417- 418 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that a Suffolk County 
law requiring retail stores selling groceries to make “health care expenditures” per hour each 
employee worked was preempted by ERISA). 
 109. See generally Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 
512 F.3d 1112, 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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survive ERISA preemption.  Like Fielder and Suffolk County, the recent 
decision is only controlling precedent in the Ninth Circuit.  However, if the 
ruling is affirmed by the Supreme Court, in the likely event that the decision 
is appealed, the implications will be national.  Additionally, the holding in 
Golden Gate Restaurant Association emphasizes the need for state and 
local governments to continue to be innovative in their healthcare efforts. 
III.  AN ACT PROVIDING ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE, QUALITY,  
ACCOUNTABLE HEALTH CARE 
Massachusetts has developed a reputation as a “breakthrough 
innovator” of healthcare reform.110  Since the late 1970s, Massachusetts 
has consistently made efforts to extend health insurance to as many citizens 
as possible.111  While some of these efforts have enjoyed greater success 
than others, combined they have helped to keep the number of 
Massachusetts residents without medical insurance below the national 
average.  Between 2004-2006, an average of 10.3% of Massachusetts 
citizens were without health insurance coverage.112  Although Massachusetts 
percentage was well below the national average of 15.3%, 10.3% of the 
population translates into roughly 653,000 uninsured people in the 
Commonwealth.113  When the Massachusetts legislature looked at these 
statistics, it decided to approach the uninsured problem from a different 
angle. 
Massachusetts recognized that the inability of the federal government to 
implement significant health reform meant that the state must change from 
within to improve its already low uninsured rate.  Accordingly, Governor Mitt 
Romney began drafting a plan in 2003 to provide universal coverage.114  
Massachusetts recognized that the cycle leading to an increase in the 
number of uninsured individuals had to be broken.  The goal of the 
Massachusetts Act is twofold.  First, the Commonwealth wants every citizen 
to have health insurance and access to quality health care.115  Second, 
Massachusetts wants to curb the inflation of medical costs and health 
 
 110. John E. McDonough et al., The Third Wave of Massachusetts Health Care Access 
Reform, HEALTH AFF., Sept. 14, 2006, at w420, at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/ 
25/6/w420 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter McDonough et al., Third Wave]. 
 111. See generally McDonough, supra note 4, at 58-59. 
 112. 2006 CENSUS, supra note 6, at 24. 
 113. Id. 
 114. McDonough, supra note 4, at 62. 
 115. See OFFICE OF MEDICAID, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION PROJECT EXTENSION REQUEST 14-
15 (2007), available at www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/eohhs/cms_waiver_2007/ma-1115-
extension.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). 
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insurance.116  The widespread support of the legislation was a critical 
element to the passage of the Massachusetts Act and its ability to achieve its 
goals.117  This support stems partly from the “unusually bipartisan and bi-
ideological” creation process of the legislation that included not only 
politicians from both sides of the aisle but also vital members of the business 
community.118  However, despite the broad support of the Massachusetts 
Act, a number of ERISA preemption concerns surround the major 
components of the legislation. 
A. The Main Elements of the Massachusetts Act 
1. Employer Mandate 
Employers with more than ten full-time equivalent employees are 
required to “pay or play” by either paying $295 annually for each employee 
without insurance or contributing a “fair and reasonable share” to their 
employees’ insurance.119  Employers fulfill the “fair share” requirement in 
one of two ways: 1) if twenty-five percent or more of their employees enroll 
in the employer’s health plan, the employer is deemed to have contributed a 
fair share; or 2) if an employer offers to pay at least thirty-three percent of 
their employees’ healthcare costs, the employer is likewise deemed to have 
contributed a fair share.120  In addition to the “pay or play” requirement, 
employers must set up a Section 125 “cafeteria plan” allowing employees to 
pay for health benefits with pre-taxed dollars.121  If an employer does not 
offer a cafeteria plan and their employees’ use of uncompensated care 
exceeds a threshold limit, the employer may be subject to a “free-rider 
surcharge.”122  The surcharge comes into effect if an employer has not set 
up a cafeteria plan and its employees are frequent users of the state’s 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Jon R. Gabel et al., Report from Massachusetts: Employers Largely Support Health 
Care Reform, and Few Signs of Crowd-Out Appear, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov. 14, 2007, at w13-
14, available at www.allhealth.org/BriefingMaterials/HealthAff-Gabel-1206.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2009); see generally ROBERT J. BLENDON ET AL., BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF 
MASSACHUSETTS FOUNDATION, THE MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH REFORM LAW: PUBLIC OPINION AND 
PERCEPTION (2006), available at www.bcbsmafoundation.org/foundationroot/en_US/ 
documents/2006Health ReformPollingreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). 
 118. McDonough et al., Third Wave, supra note 110, at w420. 
 119. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, §188(b), (c) (LexisNexis 2008). 
 120. 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.03(1)(a), (b) (2008) (when employers fulfill their “fair 
share” requirement they become exempt from the Fair Share Contribution). 
 121. 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.01(1) (2008). 
 122. 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(1)(a)-(c) (2008); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 118G, 
§18B(a) (LexisNexis 2008). 
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Uncompensated Care Pool.123  Costs to the Uncompensated Care Pool 
exceeding $50,000 in a year triggers the surcharge which will vary 
depending on the frequency that employees use free care, the number of 
employees who use free care, and the cost of the free care.124 
2. The Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector 
The Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector (the Connector) was 
created “to serve as [a] clearinghouse, or exchange, facilitating the buying, 
selling, and administration of private health insurance coverage.”125  The 
Connector has two major components: Commonwealth Care and 
Commonwealth Choice.126  Commonwealth Care “provides sliding-scale 
subsidies to individuals with incomes up to 300[%] of the federal poverty 
level . . . for the purchase of health insurance.”127  The Commonwealth 
Care program also offers individuals health insurance plans which do not 
have deductibles and individuals earning less than 150% the federal poverty 
level do not pay any premiums.128 
Commonwealth Choice is multi-faceted. The first part of 
Commonwealth Choice helps individuals who are not eligible for 
Commonwealth Care purchase health insurance with providers who have 
been approved by the Connector.129  The second part of Commonwealth 
Choice works with small businesses, defined as businesses with less than fifty 
employees, to select health insurance for their employees.130  This insurance 
is bought through the Connector, allowing small businesses to reduce 
administrative costs.131  Commonwealth Choice also offers young adults, 
 
 123. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 118G, §18B(a)-(c) (LexisNexis 2008). 
 124. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 118G, §18B(b)-(c) (LexisNexis 2008). 
 125. Edmund F. Haislmaier & Nina Owcharenko, The Massachusetts Approach: A New 
Way to Restructure State Health Insurance Markets and Public Programs, 25 HEALTH AFF. 
1580, 1582 (2006). 
 126. Commonwealth Connector, Find Insurance: Individuals and Families, Getting Started, 
at www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/site/connector/template (follow ‘getting started’ link 
under ‘Individuals & Families’) (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). 
 127. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM PLAN:  AN 
UPDATE (2007), available at www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7494-02.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 
2009) [hereinafter KAISER FAMILY FOUND., UPDATE]. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Commonwealth Connector, Find Insurance: Individuals and Families, Frequently 
Asked Questions, at www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/site/connector/template (follow 
‘getting started’ link under ‘Individuals & Families,’ then click ‘FAQ’) (last visited Feb. 13, 
2009). 
 130. CONFERENCE COMM. REP., HEALTH CARE ACCESS AND AFFORDABILITY 1, 2 (2006), 
available at www.mass.gov/legis/summary.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter COMM. 
REPORT]. 
 131. See Id. at 1. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] HAS ERISA CLOSED OUR LABORATORIES? 195 
nineteen to twenty-six year olds, a population with a historically large 
uninsured rate, a “first dollar” plan that is tailored specifically to their 
needs.132 
3. Individual Mandate 
As of July 1, 2007, every Massachusetts citizen over the age of eighteen 
is required to have a minimum level of health insurance.133  This minimum 
level, as determined by the Connector Authority, covers “preventative and 
primary care, emergency services, hospitalization benefits, ambulatory 
patient services, mental health services and prescription drug coverage.”134  
Tax filings and a newly created database tracks covered individuals.135  
Although the penalty for not having insurance is initially small, with the 
uninsured not receiving a tax refund of just over $200, the penalty 
eventually increases to fifty percent of the cost of the lowest acceptable 
coverage through the Connector.136 
These three central facets of the legislation are supported by other 
requirements that are designed to close the gaps in Massachusetts 
healthcare access systems as much as possible.137  While on its face the 
legislation appears to be capable of achieving its goal of near-universal 
coverage, the likelihood of its success would be jeopardized if one of the 
three major elements were removed. The requirements placed on employers 
have received the most attention concerning ERISA preemption challenges 
and is therefore the subject of the next section. 
B. Applying Our ERISA Preemption Framework to the Massachusetts Act 
The two requirements placed on employers under the Massachusetts Act 
is that they must:  1) offer “cafeteria plans” to their employees, and 2) pay 
of a “fair share contribution” to employee healthcare premiums for an 
 
 132. Id. at 3. 
 133. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111M, §2(a) (LexisNexis 2008). 
 134. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., UPDATE, supra note 127, at 2. 
 135. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111M, §2(b) (LexisNexis 2008); Robert Steinbrook, Health Care 
Reform in Massachusetts—A Work in Progress, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED., 2095, 2096 (2006). 
 136. Steinbrook, supra note 135; Cynthia McCormick, Health Insurance Penalties 
Announced by State, CAPE COD TIMES, Jan. 5, 2008, at www.capecodonline.com/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080105/NEWS/801050331/-1/LIFE03 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). 
 137. See McDonough et al., Third Wave, supra note 110, at w422 (“The new 
Massachusetts law, An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 
is a complex mix of Medicaid changes, subsidized insurance offerings, insurance market 
reforms, safety-net alterations, individual and employer and responsibility provisions, and 
more (Exhibit 1).”). 
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employer-sponsored plan, or in the alternative pay a tax of $295 per 
employee to the state’s Uncompensated Care Pool.138 
A general consensus among scholars is that “a premium-only cafeteria 
plan” requirement is unlikely to be preempted by ERISA.139  The reasoning 
behind this assertion lies mainly in two arguments.  First, the regulations for 
the cafeteria plans are not related to ERISA plans in any way because they 
neither refer to the plans nor rely on the existence of ERISA plans for the 
requirement to be implemented.140  Further, the cafeteria plans do not have 
a connection with ERISA plans because they have no effect on the structure 
or administration of ERISA plans.141  Second, a United States Department of 
Labor Advisory Opinion stated that cafeteria plans are not considered 
employee benefit plans, and consequently they are not regulated by 
ERISA.142  While some scholars have noted that the cafeteria plans are 
connected to the payment mechanism for ERISA plans, and consequently 
could be preempted as affecting the administration of ERISA plans,143 this 
argument is unlikely to persuade a court because it has been established 
that the plans fall outside of ERISA’s authority.  Without relating to or having 
a connection to ERISA plans, the cafeteria plan provision is safe from a 
preemption challenge. 
While the cafeteria plans are unlikely to be preempted, the “fair and 
reasonable contribution” that is part of the “pay or play” requirement of the 
Massachusetts Act is likely to be preempted.  Many scholars have examined 
whether the pay or play requirement will be preempted.  Investigating these 
arguments is instructive to evaluate the future of the legislation.  Under the 
developed framework, it must first be considered whether the area is 
traditionally regulated by the state.  Supporters of the Massachusetts Act 
argue that the requirement is an attempt to spread the burden of funding 
healthcare costs so that healthcare can be provided for less-fortunate 
citizens, and therefore the law falls within an area traditionally regulated by 
 
 138. Steinbrook, supra note 135, at 2096. 
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 140. Zelinsky, supra note 139, at 264-267. 
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Employers, 15 HEALTH CARE POL’Y REP. (BNA) No. 35, at 1192 (Sept. 10, 2007) at 
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13da2d738525734f0077b76e?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). 
 142. See Advisory Opinion from Susan G. Lahne, Chief, Division of Coverage, U.S. Dep’t 
of Labor, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin., Office of Regs. & Interpretations, to Durward J. 
Gehring. Bell, Boyd & Lloyd (July 17, 1996), at www.dol.gov/ebsa/programs/ori/advisory96/ 
96-12a.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). 
 143. Monahan, supra note 139, at 1225; see also Reece, supra note 44, at 39. 
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the states (public welfare) and should not be preempted.144  However, the 
fact that the law relates to citizens’ health, an area traditionally under state 
regulation, is unconvincing because every employee benefit plan affects 
citizens’ health and could arguably affect the state’s ability to finance 
healthcare for less-fortunate citizens.  Consequently, the law does not fall in 
the category of an area traditionally regulated by states.145 
The next step in the analysis is whether the “fair and reasonable 
contribution” relates to an ERISA plan.  Scholars argue that because the 
regulation applies to government organizations and churches, two sectors 
exempted from ERISA regulation, as well as private-sector employers, it does 
not refer to ERISA plans directly and therefore does not relate to ERISA 
plans.146  However, these arguments ignore a critical phrase in the 
regulation’s language.  The regulation requires employers to provide a 
“group health plan” or otherwise pay the $295 tax.147  One scholar, 
Edward A. Zelinsky, argues that the Internal Review Code of 1986 states 
that a “group benefit plan” includes any self-insured plan.148  Zelinsky also 
contends that because a group benefit plan includes any self-insured plan, 
and self-insured plans are deemed to be ERISA plans, the group benefit 
plans referenced in the Massachusetts Act are ERISA plans.149  While this 
argument has merit, the counter-argument that the law is generally 
applicable and regulates both self-insured plans and insured plans compels 
further analysis. 
Unlike the Maryland Fair Share Act, which applied to a single employer, 
the Massachusetts Act requires all employers to provide coverage.  
Consequently, supporters of Massachusetts Act argue that the legislation 
should not be preempted.150  However, this argument is tenuous because 
ERISA does not require a law to regulate only ERISA plans in order to trigger 
the preemption clause.  State legislation is preempted “insofar as” it 
regulates ERISA plans.151  If part of the employer mandate regulates ERISA 
plans, the section is preempted.  Therefore, it is likely a court would 
determine that the “fair share and contribution” requirement is related to 
ERISA plans and is subsequently preempted. 
 
 144. BUTLER, FAIR SHARE ACT, supra note 54, at 9. 
 145. Schuler, supra note 16, at 813. 
 146. See BUTLER, FAIR SHARE ACT, supra note 54, at 9 (“The fair share assessment applies to 
government as well as private-sector employees and so does not specifically refer to ERISA 
plans.”). 
 147. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, §188(b), (c)(10) (LexisNexis 2008). 
 148. Zelinsky, supra note 139, at 255 (citing § 5000(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
2000, as amended). 
 149. Id. at 255-56; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000). 
 150. BUTLER, supra note 44, at 9-10. 
 151. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
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Although the regulation potentially refers to ERISA plans, significantly 
more discussion exists regarding the “connection with” rule employed by the 
Travelers Court.  Proponents of the legislation center their argument around 
the small $295 tax per employee if employers decide not to provide health 
insurance.152  These supporters argue that the tax is analogous with the 
surcharges in Travelers and are merely an “indirect economic influence” for 
plan administrators.153  Patricia Butler further asserts that the tax credit is 
purely voluntary, and even if it is a strong incentive, a plan administrator is 
not bound to a particular choice.154  Therefore, Butler argues it should not 
be preempted under the Travelers doctrine.155  This reasoning is echoed by 
Amy B. Monahan, who categorizes Massachusetts’ pay or play requirement 
as “weak.”156  Monahan distinguishes the Massachusetts Act from 
Maryland’s Fair Share Act on the grounds that, in Maryland, the only 
reasonable choice for employers was to increase their spending on 
employee healthcare to eight percent of their payroll to avoid paying the 
same amount to the state government, while in Massachusetts, in almost 
every circumstance it is cheaper for employers to pay the tax rather than 
offer health coverage.157  The Court’s language in Dillingham, stating that 
California’s “‘prevailing wage statute alters the incentives, but does not 
dictate the choices,. . .’” supports the belief that Massachusetts employers 
might be presented with an incentive to provide healthcare, but ultimately 
they have the choice to not provide coverage.158  Each argument is 
substantive, and each highlights the complexity of evaluating state health 
reform legislation. 
While the issues raised by the defenders of the Massachusetts Act have 
merit, a court will likely find that the legislation has an impermissible 
connection with ERISA plans.  The legislation arguably affects the structure 
and administration of ERISA plans because it not only requires employers to 
establish the plans, but it also requires employers to make continual “fair 
 
 152. E.g., Monahan, supra note 139, at 1205 (“Unlike Maryland’s Act, which has a very 
strong ‘pay’ provision, Massachusetts’s fair share contribution law has a weak ‘pay’ 
provision—arguably allowing it to survive an ERISA preemption challenge....”); BUTLER, FAIR 
SHARE ACT, supra note 54, at 9. 
 153. Monahan, supra note 139, at 1209; see also Cal. Div. of Labor Standards 
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 329 (1997). 
 154. BUTLER, supra note 44, at 8. 
 155. Id. at 5, 8; see also Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 329 (for Dillingham doctrine in court’s 
holding). 
 156. Monahan, supra note 139, at 1213-14; see also Sidney D. Watson et al., The Road 
from Massachusetts to Missouri: What Will It Take for Other States to Replicate Massachusetts 
Health Reform?, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1331, 1350-51 (2007) (discussing the low cost of the 
assessment compared to the cost of employer sponsored health care costs). 
 157. Monahan, supra note 139, at 1215-16. 
 158. See Zelinsky, supra note 139, at 262-63 (quoting Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 334). 
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and reasonable contributions” to the plans.  By stating that an employer 
demonstrates a “fair and reasonable contribution,” either by the employer 
offering to fund one-third of employees’ healthcare costs or by twenty-five 
percent of the employees enrolling in the benefit plan, the regulation 
dictates that an employer must design his benefit plan in a certain 
manner.159  Zelinsky asserts that the Massachusetts Act is more like the law 
in Egelhoff, v. Egelhoff than Dillingham because the Massachusetts law 
governs a “central matter of plan administration”, while the Dillingham law 
only had an “incidental” connection with ERISA plans.160  The central matter 
in the Massachusetts law, according to Zelinsky, is the payment of benefits 
and the requirements placed on employers.161 
Scholars who fall on both sides of this argument recognize that the 
Massachusetts Act will have difficulty satisfying Congress’ desire for 
uniformity.  These concerns stem from two areas of the pay or play 
mandate.  First, “[w]hile the assessment of $295 per employee by itself 
wouldn’t prohibit the uniform administration of employee benefit plans, if 
other states are able to follow in Massachusetts[‘] footsteps, national 
employers would not be able to effectively offer and administer one national 
employee benefit plan.”162  Furthermore, the “fair and reasonable 
contribution” requirement of the legislation provides guidelines that may 
conflict with those promulgated by other states.163  Consequently, multi-state 
employers would find themselves having to comply with varying sets of 
regulations.  This potential conflict is exactly the type of conflict Congress 
intended the preemption clause to prevent. 
Whether a court determines that the Massachusetts Act explicitly refers to 
ERISA plans through its “group health plan” language, has an 
“impermissible connection” with ERISA plans through its “fair and 
reasonable contribution” requirement, or merely conflicts with Congress’s 
desire for uniformity, the employer mandate of the Massachusetts Act is 
likely to be preempted.164 
 
 159. Monahan, supra note 139, at 1215. 
 160. Zelinsky, supra note 139, at 263-64; Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147-48 
(2001).  In Egelhoff, the Supreme Court held that a Washington statute that eliminated the 
designation of a spouse as a beneficiary of a non-probate asset, including life insurance 
policies falling within ERISA’s authority, was preempted by ERISA.  Id.  Although the statute 
permitted employers to opt out of the law with specific language, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that the statute was preempted because it mandated plan structure and language.  Id. 
 161. Zelinsky, supra note 139, at 263-64. 
 162. Reece, supra note 44, at 38. 
 163. Monahan, supra note 139, at 1215. 
 164. See Reece, supra note 44, at 38 (“While we acknowledge that the Massachusetts law 
falls into the category of broad health regulations that Congress didn’t envision preempting 
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Interestingly, the Massachusetts Act has not yet been challenged in 
court.  The legislation’s survival thus far may be attributable to its extensive 
support.  This popularity combined with its potentially widespread, positive 
effects have led some scholars to believe that Massachusetts could receive a 
waiver similar to the waiver that the state of Hawaii received shortly after the 
enactment of ERISA for its “Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act”.165  This waiver 
would exempt the Massachusetts Act from ERISA preemption.  However, 
Hawaii is the only state that has received an exemption and Congressional 
willingness to issue another exemption remains unclear. 
C. Lessons From Massachusetts For States Aiming for Universal Coverage 
While there are a number of aspects of the Massachusetts Act that other 
states may want to adopt, the unique circumstances that exist in 
Massachusetts limit the portability of the legislation.  Massachusetts entered 
the reform process with several elements in its favor.  First, not only has 
Massachusetts historically had a low uninsured population, but it also 
started with several sources of financing that other states will not be able to 
draw upon.  Since the creation of the Uncompensated Care Pool in 1985, 
the Commonwealth paid hundreds of millions of dollars for care provided to 
the uninsured.166  This funding was shifted to help subsidize care for 
individuals obtaining insurance through Commonwealth Care.167  
Furthermore, one of the reasons that Massachusetts enacted the reform was 
to ensure that the state would not lose the $385 million it was receiving 
from the federal government under the Medicaid extension it had been 
granted.168  Most states would not be unable to draw upon such significant 
funding sources as the Uncompensated Care Pool and the federal Medicaid 
extension.  Consequently, other states would have to be creative to make 
universal coverage financially feasible. 
The political environment in Massachusetts was also unique.  During the 
creation of the legislation, a Republican governor and a Democratic state 
Congress worked together to create a broadly supported, comprehensive 
bill.  Additionally, the business community recognized the importance of 
increasing health coverage in order to reign in the ever increasing price of 
 
when it passed ERISA, the ‘fair share’ provision of the law has an impermissible connection 
with an employee benefit plan.”). 
 165. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A) (2000); see also Zelinsky, supra note 139, at 282 
(“Because of the bipartisan provenance of the new Massachusetts health law, Massachusetts is 
particularly well positioned to request that Congress amend section 514 to immunize the 
Massachusetts law from ERISA preemption.”). 
 166. McDonough et al., Third Wave, supra note 110, at w422. 
 167. Id. at w426. 
 168. Haislmaier & Owcharenko, supra note 125, at 1586. 
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medical care and worked with the legislature.  The business community 
supported the legislation even though the employer mandate would 
statutorily place a burden on employers to help fund the health coverage for 
the state.  Attempts by other state legislatures to shift a larger portion of 
healthcare funding to employers resulted in lawsuits being filed by 
employers, suggesting that passing coverage similar to Massachusetts and 
gaining support for the legislation will be difficult.169 
Despite the likelihood that other states will have to structure their health 
reform differently, there are a number of lessons that can be taken away 
from the Massachusetts Act.  First, states should work closely with their 
business communities when drafting healthcare reform plans.  States can 
increase the likelihood that the legislation will later be accepted by including 
the business community in the development of the policy.  Second, the state 
should attempt to incorporate previous, successful health reform efforts.  
The Massachusetts Act would never have been possible without drawing 
upon the Uncompensated Care Pool and Medicaid extension.  Finally, 
states hoping to provide universal health care systems need to take a 
comprehensive approach to drafting the legislation.  An individual towered 
solution will be unable to succeed.  By creating the Commonwealth Health 
Insurance Connector and the Individual and Employer Mandates, 
Massachusetts accounted for as broad a spectrum of the population as 
possible. 
Overall, it is uncertain whether the Massachusetts Act will survive an 
ERISA challenge or whether other states have the capability to replicate the 
reform.  However, the legislation is the most comprehensive state health 
reform that the nation has seen and consequentially other states should 
monitor the progress of the reform as they struggle to design their own 
health reform to combat the growing uninsured population and the cost of 
medical care. 
 
 169. See, e.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183 94th Cir. 2007) 
(Maryland Fair Share Act that would require employers with more that 10,000 employees to 
either spend eight percent of their revenues on employer healthcare or pay the difference to 
the state struck down); see also Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Suffolk County, 497 F.Supp.2d 
403, 405, 411-13, 418 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (striking down New York law requiring grocery 
stores to provide health insurance). 
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IV.  HOW LEGISLATURES CAN DRAFT HEALTH REFORM TO AVOID 
ERISA PREEMPTION 
A. A Comprehensive Health Reform Option Designed Within ERISA’s 
Restraints 
Scholars have offered suggestions concerning how to draft legislation to 
avoid ERISA preemption.170  However, most of these solutions are 
incomplete and do not offer the comprehensive strategy essential to a 
successful reform.  If states have available resources, the optimal solution 
for avoiding ERISA preemption is a combination of a tax on all employers 
and elements of the Massachusetts Act.  By retaining Massachusetts’ 
Commonwealth Connector and the Individual Mandate, but excluding the 
Employer Mandate from future legislation, states can avoid many of the 
ERISA preemption concerns that have arisen with the Massachusetts Act. 
A general tax on employers serves several purposes.  First, the tax 
should be written as a general tax on employers to raise money for public 
health programs.  By focusing on public health programs, the tax falls within 
an area traditionally regulated by the state, the health and safety of citizens, 
and consequently avoids ERISA challenges.171  The money collected from 
the tax can be used to subsidize health insurance on a sliding-scale for 
individuals, similar to the Uncompensated Care Pool in the Massachusetts 
Act.  Under this tax, employers would no longer directly contribute to the 
cost of health insurance for their employees, but states could still rely on the 
business community to contribute to the overall cost of medical care.  
Because employees would be responsible for securing their own insurance, 
the subsidies through the exchange would have to be designed to ensure 
this is financially feasible.  However, if the tax was written so the employer 
paid a certain amount per employee, the state could essentially create an 
employer mandate through alternative means.  Additionally, the inclusion of 
all businesses in the tax should help generate the necessary funds. 
Creating an exchange similar to Massachusetts’ Commonwealth 
Connector is also critical to achieving high levels of meaningful health 
coverage.  Through the exchange, the state can regulate the insurance 
options available to citizens and ensure that a minimal level of care is 
offered by each insurer.  The connector system allows the insurance market 
to continue to enjoy the benefits of competition between private insurers but 
 
 170. See McOwen, supra note 54, at 58-59; see also BUTLER, supra note 44, at 6-8 
(advocating for state reporting requirements and tax benefits); see also Reece, supra note 44, 
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also eliminates any substandard coverage plans.  All individuals would 
acquire their health insurance through the Connector.  By disconnecting 
health insurance from employers, states guarantee the absolute portability of 
coverage.  Clearly, the design and infrastructure of this element is pivotal in 
the success of the entire system. 
The individual mandate is likewise essential to the feasibility of the 
legislation.  Without this mandate, there is no indication that any substantial 
change would occur.  Consequently, the critical population of young adults 
would continue to have a large number of uninsured individuals.  Because 
young adults tend to be healthier than other segments of the population, 
insurance companies rely on these individuals to balance out the high 
payments they have to make for the medical care for their other 
beneficiaries.  A large portion of young adults choosing to forego health 
insurance and pay the penalties would leave insurers with a larger number 
of costly patients without a significant population of enrolled healthy patients 
to help provide balance.  Insurance companies might not be able to bear 
this financial burden.  This possibility led the Massachusetts legislature to 
create a special, low-priced healthcare option specifically for young adults 
and include significant penalties for individuals refusing to secure insurance.  
The individual mandate ensures a robust enrollee population capable of 
effectively spreading the risk and cost among themselves. 
The elimination of the employer mandate significantly reduces the 
likelihood of a successful ERISA challenge.  Furthermore, states can achieve 
an even higher probability of each citizen receiving high quality health 
insurance by requiring that each prospective insurer to be approved before 
selling insurance in the state.  As with most comprehensive heath reform, 
this reform effort would have to overcome significant political opposition.172  
However, the current national environment concerning healthcare might 
encourage law-makers to compromise to pass meaningful legislation.173 
CONCLUSION 
Since the time of ERISA’s enactment, the federal legislation has grown 
into a law with frustratingly vague limits to its power.  While ERISA has 
largely achieved its goal of ensuring that individuals receive their retirement 
benefits, it has also had the effect of stifling state innovation in the name of 
national uniformity.  As case law continues to build and states are given 
more guidance, legislatures will undoubtedly become more savvy and 
sophisticated with the laws they produce.  This sophistication will push courts 
 
 172. See generally JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS: HOW WE GOT 
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to consistently refine their interpretation of the scope of ERISA preemption.  
Additionally, the cultivation will provide courts with the opportunity to reduce 
the power of the preemption clause and provide an opening for legislatures 
to address their citizens’ concerns.  Many scholars feel that ERISA is an 
antiquated law that can only be remedied by Congressional intervention.174  
When considering the length of time that a Congressional revision would 
take, the current healthcare situation, the constantly changing political 
atmosphere, and the power of business lobbies, it is evident that this 
solution is not a practical resolution for the near future.  As Massachusetts 
took over three years to develop its reform, state reform will not be 
instantaneous, but it remains a more reasonable solution than 
Congressional revision.  However, Congressional revision of ERISA should 
not be discounted.  The law’s detachment from the healthcare industry will 
likely grow without federal intervention.  In the meantime, states must 
continue to be the laboratories for the country and attempt to develop and 
implement comprehensive healthcare reform. 
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